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Available online xxxxMost families in the child protective services system also interact with the child support enforcement system.
This study exploits a natural experiment inWisconsin, created by the state's large regional variation in child sup-
port referral policy, to estimate a potentially important effect of child support enforcement on the duration of
out-of-home foster care placement. The effect we examine is whether requiring parents to pay support to offset
the costs of foster care delays children's reuniﬁcation with a parent or other permanent placement. We ﬁnd ev-
idence of this unintended effect, which is important not only because longer foster care spells are expensive for
taxpayers, but also because extended placements in foster caremay have consequences for child well-being. Our
results highlight the potential importance of cross-systems analysis and the potential consequences when the
policies and fundamental objectives of public systems are inconsistently coordinated. We discuss the implica-
tions of our ﬁndings for child support and child protective services policy.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).Keywords:
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Cost recovery1 Permanency or permanent placement is deﬁned by the CPS systemas reuniﬁcationwith
a parent (either the parent(s) from whom they were removed, or another parent), adop-
tion, or guardianship (a permanent caretaker). The term permanency is used by the CPS1. Introduction
The child protective services (CPS) system can be seen as a safety net
of last resort. While removing children from their parents' care is an ex-
treme intervention, recent estimates suggest that, in the U.S., 6% of all
children and 12% of black children will have experienced out-of-home
care by the time they reach age 18 (Wildeman & Emanuel, 2014),
with estimated costs exceeding $10 billion annually (Scarcella, Bess,
Hecht Zielewski, Warner, & Geen, 2004). Most children and families
with CPS involvement also interact with other social service systems
that can have very different goals and models of administration and ﬁ-
nancing. Of particular interest for this analysis is the potential for most
families receiving CPS to also interact with the child support system, ei-
ther as previous participants in child support, or as potential targets for
child support enforcement when children are removed from the home.
Though the overlap between CPS and child support is common and
known in practice, there has been very limited research analyzing the
interactions between these two systems and the implications for dually
served families. As we will show, the two systems' policies and funda-
mental objectives are not consistently coordinated, which leads to sub-
stantial unintended negative consequences both for the families
involved and taxpayers.
The scope of the child support enforcement system is generally lim-
ited to establishing and enforcing nonresident parents' ﬁnancial obliga-
tions to their children. In contrast, the CPS system is responsible forverty, 1180 Observatory Drive,
. This is an open access article under
aking parents pay: The unin
rg/10.1016/j.childyouth.2016assuring child safety, permanency, and well-being, so its scope and re-
sponsibilities extend well beyond ﬁnancial resources. The scarcity of
studies of CPS-child support interactions may reﬂect important differ-
ences in the policies and goals of these programs or a limited recogni-
tion of the potential importance of their interaction, but research in
this area has also been hampered by the limited availability of relevant
survey data and technical challenges associated with the analysis of ad-
ministrative data from separately managed systems. This paper begins
to address these limitations. We use a newly developed data set,
whichmerges administrative data from several state programs, and ex-
ploit a natural experiment inWisconsin created by unintended large re-
gional variation in child support referral policies, to estimate a
potentially important effect of child support enforcement on the dura-
tion of out-of-home (or substitute) care placements.We assesswhether
requiring parents to pay child support to offset the costs of foster care
delays children's permanent placement, whether through reuniﬁcation
with a parent, adoption, or guardianship.1 We ﬁnd evidence of this un-
intended effect. If requiring parents to pay support results in a longer
foster care spell because it decreases economic resources needed forsystem to refer to the intention of the placement, not its actual outcome. Children in per-
manent placementsmay be subsequently removed from the placement again. In the pres-
ent paper, we expand on the administrative deﬁnition of permanency by limiting it to
those children who achieve permanency and who are not removed again for at least six
months.
the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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2 M. Cancian et al. / Children and Youth Services Review xxx (2016) xxx–xxxachieving the conditions of reuniﬁcation, then this policymay beﬁscally
counterproductive, especially in light of low levels of collection2 and the
additional costs of child support enforcement (Chellew, Noyes, &
Selekman, 2012). This question has consequential implications for
child support and CPS policy, and illustrates the importance of cross-
system policy analysis.
2. Policy context and research question
The CPS system is designed to serve children at risk ofmaltreatment.
In 2012, approximately 6 million children in the U.S. were reported to
CPS, and more than 460,000 children were living in an out-of-home
placement as a result of CPS involvement (U.S. Department of Health
and Human Services, 2013). Most children enter foster care due to ne-
glect, rather than abuse (Sedlak et al., 2010), with low income an impor-
tant risk factor (Yang, 2012). CPS agencies are accountable for ensuring
child safety and promoting well-being, either at home or in an out-of-
home placement. While many children placed out-of-home are
reuniﬁed with their parents quickly, 28% of children remain in foster
care for two or more years (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2013). Safely and quickly reunifying families is an important
priority, to reduce both disruption to children and the public costs of
foster care.
Children with CPS involvement are likely to also be involved with
the child support system. Two distinct factors account for the high prob-
ability of families receiving CPS also participating in the child support
system. First, children living in single-parent families are overrepresent-
ed in the CPS system (Sedlak & Broadhurst, 1996; Sedlak et al., 2010),
and, since these children live apart from one of their parents, they are
usually eligible for child support. Second, federal and state policies call
for parents whose children are placed in foster care to be referred to
child support enforcement so that parents may be ordered to offset
some of the costs of that care. Federal policy also calls for child support
previously directed from nonresident to resident parents to be
redirected to the state, and, for those that do not have orders, that
new orders be established for both pre-placement resident and nonres-
ident parents to cover the costs of foster care.3
One of the goals of the child support enforcement system is to sup-
port and enforce nonresident parents' contributions to their children's
ﬁnancial well-being. For children living with one parent, support typi-
cally is due from the nonresident to the resident parent and is intended
to directly beneﬁt the child. Child support can play a particularly critical
role in the incomepackages of low-income single-parent families (Pirog
& Ziol-Guest, 2006; Sorensen & Hill, 2004), and some evidence suggests
that increased child support may reduce the risk of child welfare in-
volvement (Cancian, Yang, & Slack, 2013). Historically, the government
has often retained child support payments from low-income families
receiving cash assistance to offset welfare costs, but in recent years pol-
icies have changed to allowmore child support to be passed through to
resident parents receiving assistance—making welfare and child sup-
port complements, rather than substitutes (Cancian, Meyer, & Caspar,
2008; Chellew et al., 2012).4 The change in policy to prioritize economic
support to families over cost-recovery for government has not been ex-
tended to children in foster care, however. Federal guidance and state
policies generally call for child support orders to offset government
costs, rather than directly beneﬁt children, when children are placed
out of home (Chellew et al., 2012).2 Estimates fromWisconsin suggest that collections account for between 0.5% (in Mil-
waukee County, the largest child welfare system in Wisconsin) and 4.0% (in other
counties) of direct provider payments. Estimates of the proportion collected are lower if
administrative costs are included (Chellew et al., 2012).
3 For a discussion of policy related to referral of families with children in out-of-home
placement to child support enforcement, see Chellew et al. (2012).
4 There is substantial variation in pass-through amounts across states (Vinson &
Turetsky, 2009), with Wisconsin among the most generous.
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we are led to ask the following: How often do redirections of previous
support and referrals for new child support occur, and to what effect?
We are particularly interested in whether charging child support to
pre-placement resident parents, especially single mothers, extends the
time children spend separated from their families of origin.5 Both eco-
nomic theory and the literature on foster care suggest that the potential
effects of child support enforcement on families that have children in a
foster placement vary depending on who is making a payment and
where the payment is directed. Consider the most common situation,
in which the mother is the pre-placement resident parent. When chil-
dren are removed from this mother's home, an order for child support
from the mother, designed to offset the costs of foster care, will reduce
the economic resources available to her. To the extent that poverty or
other resource limitations contributed to the initial placement, reducing
resources by ordering child support payments may increase barriers to
reuniﬁcation and permanency. For example, mothers may have more
difﬁculty correcting deﬁcient housing situations; in addition, the stress
associated with increased ﬁnancial pressure may worsen any psycho-
logical or behavioral barriers to reuniﬁcation (we review related litera-
ture below). The redirection of support initially ordered from the father
to the mother may have a similar effect, though perhaps to a lesser de-
gree if child support payments were irregular, or if the mother's partic-
ipation in welfare led to only a partial pass-through of the father's
payments. On the other hand, if the pre-placement nonresident father
does not have a pre-existing child support order and placement results
in a new order for child support from him, then that new order may
beneﬁt the mother after reuniﬁcation and the potential for additional
resources may facilitate economic stability and therefore speed reuniﬁ-
cation and permanency. Finally, in addition to these indirect effects on
permanency through economic stability, a direct motivation for these
parents to work towards more rapid permanency may result from the
negative economic incentive that comes from charging parents for the
costs of care. All of these theoretical conjectures direct us to examine
this question empirically.
Our goals in this paper are, ﬁrst, to document the patterns of child
support orders and payments for families with children placed in foster
care, and then to examine the relationship between orders and place-
ment outcomes. We consider the frequency of orders and payments
from nonresident parents to resident parents prior to placement and
while the children are in foster care.We also consider new child support
orders and payments—for both nonresident parents and pre-placement
resident parents—that are established to offset the costs of foster care.
Finally, we evaluate the hypothesis that establishing or increasing a
child support order to offset costs may delay reuniﬁcation and increase
time children live apart from their parents.
3. Prior literature
Despite the overlap in populations served, there is remarkably little
research on the interaction of the child support and CPS systems. The
few existing studies document the relationship between child support
receipt and the risk of subsequent CPS involvement. The secondNation-
al Incidence Study of Child Abuse and Neglect (NIS), completed in the
late 1980s, included a report on the relationship between nonpayment
of child support and the occurrence of child maltreatment (Westat,
1992). The NIS analysis is dated, and was limited to comparisons of
the child support received by three samples of substantiated CPS
cases, relative to all child support cases. A more recent analysis
(Cancian et al., 2013), documented contact with the CPS system5 The redirection of child support has been the focus of recent federal interest, as
discussed inResident Fathers and the ChildWelfare System, the lead article by Vicki Turetsky
(2009), Commissioner of the U.S. Ofﬁce of Child Support Enforcement.
tended consequences of charging parents for foster care, Children and
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6 The Wisconsin Multi-System Person File (MSPF) is a merged administrative data set
created by the Institute for Research on Poverty in collaboration with the Department of
Children and Families and otherWisconsin State agencies. TheMSPF includes comprehen-
sive participation information for a number of programs serving families in the state of
Wisconsin, and is designed to support research to improve programs, including this pro-
ject. Construction of the MSFP was supported by resources from the State of Wisconsin
and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. For a detailed discussion of the
MSPF, technical issues, and data security, see Brown (2012).
7 Understanding family structure, particularlywhether themother and/or the father are
living with the children at the time of initial placement (that is, whether they are resident
or nonresident parents), is important to our analysis. We aim to distinguish families in
which all themother's childrenwere livingwith her, and not with their father, at the start
of the spell, and to exclude families in which all or some of the children were living with
their father, or in which any of the mother's children were living elsewhere. We further
restrict the sample to those with at least one father identiﬁed in our administrative data.
Given the complexities of child support orders in caseswhere custody of children is shared
or split between parents, we limit our analysis sample to mothers who should be eligible
for child support for all their children. As noted in the discussion of sensitivity tests, our
results are robust to including a larger sample not limited by living arrangements.
8 July of 2004 is selected for the beginning of the sample window because of concerns
regarding the comprehensiveness of WiSACWIS data prior to that date. June of 2006 is se-
lected to allowus to follow children for at least four years after removal (plus an additional
six months after any permanency) while avoiding any right censoring of the data.
9 Fewer than 100 fathers have children with more than one of the mothers in our
sample.
10 Further details of the data used for this paper are available in Cancian, Cook, Seki, &
Wimer (2012).
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different amounts of child support.While both studies suggest that fam-
ilies receiving lower amounts of child support are at greater risk of CPS
involvement, neither of these studies is able to address the causal rela-
tionship; many factors associated with nonreceipt of child support are
also associated with CPS involvement. In contrast, Cancian et al.
(2013), drawing from a random assignment experiment in Wisconsin
that resulted in differential child support receipt, provide evidence
that higher child support income reduces CPS involvement among fam-
ilies who have received cash welfare.
While not addressing child support per se, a related literature con-
siders the relationship between income, especially cash welfare, and
child maltreatment or CPS involvement. As noted above, neglect, rather
than abuse, is the most prevalent form of child maltreatment, and a
range of economic factors have been shown to be important predictors
of CPS involvement due to neglect (Slack et al., 2011). Needell, Cuccaro-
Alamin, Brookhart, and Lee (1999) used merged administrative records
from California to consider the subsequent CPS involvement of children
in families receiving welfare in the early 1990s. They found that within
ﬁve years of entering the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, about a quarter of children had been referred to CPS,
and 3% had been placed in foster care. Children from single-parent
homes (who are generally demographically eligible for child support)
were overrepresented among those reported and, especially, among
thosewith a foster care placement. Considering two samples of families
applying for cashwelfare before and after the welfare reform of 1997 in
Wisconsin, Courtney, Dworsky, Piliavin, and Zinn (2005) show thatwel-
fare applicants are increasingly overrepresented in the CPS system. In a
companion study, Dworsky, Courtney, and Zinn (2007) analyzed CPS in-
volvement amongpost-reform applicants, and foundhigher rates of CPS
involvement for families with younger children and a history of welfare
receipt. A number of authors have found that reductions inwelfare pay-
ments are associated with a higher risk of CPS involvement. Shook
(1999) using data from Illinois, found that reductions in welfare bene-
ﬁts, in the absence of increases in earnings,were associatedwith CPS in-
volvement, though Slack, Lee, and Berger (2007) note that it is difﬁcult
to give the association a causal interpretation. In twopapers, Paxson and
Waldfogel (2002, 2003) used state and time variation and found a large
negative relationship between welfare beneﬁt generosity and foster
care caseloads at the state level. In an experimental study, using data
fromDelaware'swelfare reform, Fein and Lee (2003)ﬁndonly small im-
pacts on child neglect, and no impacts on foster care placements.
While no previous study ofwhichwe are aware addresses the role of
child support in foster care spell lengths, Courtney (1994) considers a
number of risk factors in his early study of time to reuniﬁcation
among children in foster care in California. He ﬁnds that children from
lower-income families make a slower transition home. Wells and Guo
(2006) found that those with lower overall average incomes (including
both cash assistance and earnings) were reuniﬁed more slowly. They
also found that mothers who experienced a substantial decline in wel-
fare beneﬁts after their children were placed in foster care experienced
delays in reuniﬁcation in contrast to post-welfare reform mothers with
less decline in welfare beneﬁts after the foster care placement.
In sum, while there is very limited research directly considering the
interactions between the child support and CPS systems, related research
suggests important relationships between economic resources and CPS
involvement and outcomes. Poor families are more likely to be involved
with the CPS system, and to experience longer separations once their chil-
dren are placed in foster care. Reductions in welfare income have been
tied to both CPS involvement and longer out-of-home placements.
These studies suggest that if child support orders to offset the costs of fos-
ter care placements are enforced, the reduction in income might be ex-
pected to contribute to longer foster care placements. We consider
these issues below, documenting the likelihood that parents are charged
support, and estimating the effect on the length of foster care placements.
In particular, we use administrative data from Wisconsin and aim toPlease cite this article as: Cancian, M., et al., Making parents pay: The unin
Youth Services Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2016identify the causal effect using the county-level variation in the probabil-
ity of an order to pay child support as an instrument.4. Data
We use administrative data fromWisconsin's CPS system, as report-
ed in the Wisconsin Statewide Automated Child Welfare Information
System (WiSACWIS), to identify families with children who are re-
moved from parental care and placed out of home. The sample drawn
from WiSACWIS is merged with Wisconsin child support system
(KIDS) data. Other information, including unemployment insurance re-
cords and demographic characteristics, are drawn from the Wisconsin
Multi-System Person File (MSPF).6 We focus our primary analysis on
mothers in Wisconsin who were living with all their children,7 but not
with any of the children's identiﬁed father(s), and who had a child re-
moved and placed in foster care in a two-year period between July of
2004 and June of 2006.8 We then follow the placement experience for
all the mothers' children for four years after the initial removal, and
monitor any re-removals within six months for children achieving per-
manency in those four years. We restrict our sample to mothers with at
least one child age 14 or less at the time of removal, who therefore have
at least oneminor child for the full four years of our analysis (N=3032).
In the great majority of families (92.5%; N= 2804) all the placed chil-
dren transition to permanency (reuniﬁcation, adoption, or guardian-
ship) within 48 months. These 2804 mothers have had 10,476
children with 5671 separately identiﬁed fathers.9 We use data from
the KIDS system to measure child support orders and payments made
by mothers to offset the costs of foster care, by fathers to offset the
costs of foster care, or by fathers to the mothers.10
We analyze the ﬁrst observed spell of foster care that starts after
June 2004 (when reliable data for this analysis begin). We count a
mother as entering a spell when any child is removed from her care
(that is, when she transitions to having at least one child in an foster
care placement), and we count her as exiting the spell when all her
known children achieve permanency (that is, when she transitions
back to having no children in a temporary placement, even if some chil-
dren have been adopted or are in another permanent placement other
than reuniﬁcation with the mother). We focus on the spell with any
children in a temporary placement out of the home because this is the
period during which federal and state policy recommend a child sup-
port order to offset the costs of foster care. As discussed below, we
test the sensitivity of our results to alternative sample construction.tended consequences of charging parents for foster care, Children and
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Fig. 1. Share of parents with child support orders: variation by length of out-of-home placement (OHP).
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Webegin by documenting how familieswhohave children placed in
foster care are treated by the child support system, both before they
have children in foster care and during the period of placement. We
compare child support orders and payments at several points: (1) in
the month prior to the start of the foster care spell, (2) at any time dur-
ing the spell, and (3) in the ﬁnal month of the placement.We document
child support owed and paid by the nonresident father(s) of the
mother's child(ren), and whether that support is owed and paid to the
mother or to the government to offset placement costs, but we focus
in particular on child support orders and payments from the pre-place-
ment resident mother to the government to offset costs. In the case of
nonresident fathers, orders to pay support to offset the costs of foster
care may be the result of existing orders being redirected from the res-
ident mother to the government.11 In the case of pre-placement resi-
dent mothers, orders to pay child support to offset the costs of foster
care are typically new. We analyze how these orders and payments vary
by child support history (i.e., whether there are pre-placement orders), as
well as by economic status (i.e., father's earnings, mother's earnings) and
demographic characteristics (i.e., father's age, mother's age, mother's race,
whether the mother has children with more than one father).
We then consider evidence for the causal effect of these child support
enforcement actions on the duration of foster care placement because the
policy implications of any relationship depend critically on the direction
of causality. The identiﬁcation of these causal effects is challenging, since re-
ferrals from the CPS system to the child support system may depend on
characteristics that are also associated with later placement outcomes. As
shown in Fig. 1, the simple descriptive results suggest a positive relation-
ship between orders and spell length. Almost half our sample (49%) is ob-
served tohave aplacement spell of sixmonths or less; only 15%have a spell
lasting two years or longer.12 Few cases with spells of six months or less11 Determining the beneﬁciary of child support payments is complex. If the family has
multiple children, and only one of them is removed to an out-of-home placement, only
a portion of the existing child support order may be redirected from the mother. Another
complication results from the high proportion (over 60%) of mothers in our sample who
havehad childrenwithmultiple fathers. In these instances, one (ormore) of a father's chil-
dren may be in substitute care, resulting in a redirection of child support, while another
father's children remain with the mother, who continues to receive child support on be-
half of her resident children.
12 Recall that our sample excludes about 7.5% of mothers with children removed from
their care and not achieving permanency within 48 months: this largely accounts for the
low (relative to national estimates) proportion of cases with long spells.
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Youth Services Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2016haveorders to offset costs (19% for fathers, 8% formothers), but suchorders
aremore common for thosewith longer spells, rising to over 60% of fathers
and 40% of mothers with spells of two years or more. Parents whose chil-
dren are in foster care for a longer period are more likely to be ordered to
pay support to offset the costs of that care.13 This positive correlation be-
tween the order and placement spell could reﬂect that the child support
order increased the barriers to reuniﬁcation. Alternatively, it could be that
the order is the result of the longer period in foster care. In particular, if
the longer placementwas anticipatedbasedon the reasons for removal, ex-
pected placement lengthmay havemotivated the referral and pursuit of an
order. Moreover, the longer placement provides more time for the admin-
istrative steps required for an order to be established.
To identify the causal effect of orders on placement duration, we use an
instrumental variable (IV) approach. We estimate time to
reuniﬁcation—that is, the length of the spell starting when the ﬁrst child
is removed from the mother's care and ending when all the children are
reuniﬁed.We use the county-level probability of an order to pay child sup-
port to offset placement costs as an instrument—since this probability af-
fects the likelihood that the mother will have an order, but is arguably
otherwise independent of case characteristics that inﬂuence the time to re-
uniﬁcation (evidence for this independence is presented below). There is
substantial variation across counties in the proportion of mothers ordered
to pay support to offset the costs of care (see Fig. 2). We use this variation
to identifymotherswhoaremore likely to be ordered to pay support to off-
set costs, and analyze differences in time to reuniﬁcation, essentially com-
paring mothers in low- and high-probability counties. This analysis
provides an estimate of the Local Average Treatment Effect of child support
referral policy (at the county level), independent of the speciﬁc characteris-
tics of the individual case and family. This is a standard approach for esti-
mating the causal effects of those who are potentially affected by the
referral policy; however, the results cannot be extended to those who
will never be affected by the policy variations (Imbens & Angrist, 1994).
Also, the implications of the results for other states should be carefully con-
sidered, since the study uses only the across-county variation within13 We might also expect signiﬁcant declines in orders, or the amount of orders, for fa-
thers to provide support tomothers, when children are in substitute care longer. However,
as shown in Fig. 1, there is no consistent pattern between length of placement and the like-
lihood of an order from the father(s) to the mother during placement. This is somewhat
surprising, and reﬂects in part a delay in redirecting orders, as well as that many mothers
retain custody of some of their children, evenwhile other children are placed out of home.
We also ﬁnd they are more likely to make a payment towards those costs, and in the case
of mothers, make larger average payments (not shown).
tended consequences of charging parents for foster care, Children and
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15 While our sample is restricted tomothers with at least one identiﬁed father in our da-
ta, not all these fathers are considered a legally established father in the child support sys-
tem (i.e., they were identiﬁed as the father in other administrative data systems). Two-
thirds of themothers in our sample have childrenwith at least one father legally identiﬁed
through paternity establishment. About 60% of these mothers have a child support order
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ments (GMM) for the estimation method in our main speciﬁcation.14 For
estimation,weuse theﬁrst-stage robust F-statistics as a test ofweak instru-
ments for just identiﬁed speciﬁcations.
An analysis based on theWisconsin experience allows us to exploit the
speciﬁc institutional context in that state, which provides a natural experi-
ment and a relevant instrument (i.e., county-level child support order
rates). Wisconsin has a state-supervised, county-operated child welfare
program, wherein policies are set by the state but there is substantial vari-
ation in interpretation and implementation across counties. All counties use
the same CPS electronic case management system, which requires that
three questions be answered in order for the case to be referred to the
child support system. The fact that CPS caseworkers exercise signiﬁcant dis-
cretion when answering these questions provides a source of exogeneity
that canbeutilized in the IV analysis. This variation appears tobemotivated
primarily by agencyﬁnancial practices, rather than case characteristics, and
by the lack of communication between local child support and CPS depart-
ments (as observed in the reviewof local agency practices byChellewet al.,
2012;—especially pp. 8–10—and Howard, Noyes, & Cancian, 2013). The
identiﬁcation of the parameter of interest comes from the following:
when we compare two families with the same circumstances, except that
one lives in a county that ismore likely to refer a CPS child to the child sup-
port systemand the other is in a county that is less likely tomake such a re-
ferral, the difference in time to reuniﬁcation between these two families
identiﬁes the effect of a child support order.
While evidence from the reviews of local practice cited above indi-
cates that these county-level measures are uncorrelated with the char-
acteristics of individual cases, one potential concern is that child support
order establishment rates are correlatedwith other aspects of CPS prac-
tice,which in turn affect the timingof reuniﬁcation. For example, amore
“punitive” orientation in a county could contribute to both more child
support orders and slower reuniﬁcation. While there is not enough
within-county over-time variation in child support policy to include
county ﬁxed effects, we do address this concern by including a measure14 The Generalized Method of Moments provides an estimation framework that utilizes
the orthogonality of the error term and the instrument variable. This estimator does not
impose a distributional assumption, so we highlight the GMM results only (Greene,
2003, p. 555). Sensitivity analysis is conducted using other estimators.
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substantiated.6. Results
6.1. Child support orders and payments before and during a foster care
placement
Involvement in the child support system is likely to be consequential
for CPS outcomes only if a substantial portion of families in the CPS sys-
temare alsoparticipants in the child support system.While themajority
of children in foster care are from single-parent homes, there has been
limited systematic analysis of the extent of participation in the formal
child support system. To address this gap we begin with a sample that
includes mothers who are initially observed to live with all their
known children, and not with the child(ren)'s father(s). For these fam-
ilies, policy would generally provide for legally established fathers15 to
have an order to pay child support to the mother prior to placement.
As shown in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, 52% of mothers were owed sup-
port in the month prior to placement; that is to say, a father of at least
one of their children had been ordered to pay child support for that
child. When support was owed it was substantial, primarily because
61% of these mothers had orders with multiple partners: the mean
amount for those with an order was $408 per month.16
When the children are placed in care and the placement is expected
to be long-term, any existing child support owed by the father of those
children should be automatically redirected to offset costs associatedprior to out-of-home placement, higher than the 52% for the sample as a whole. Note,
however, that paternity establishment is unnecessary and irrelevant for children who
were born to married parents—a status we cannot consistently observe in our data.
16 In themonth before placement few fathers (5%) ormothers (3%) owe support to offset
substitute care costs. Those few cases are presumably for a placement prior to the current
observed spell.
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Table 1
Child support orders before and during foster care placements.
By fathers to mother By fathers to govt. for foster care costs By mothers to govt. for foster care costs
Any support owed (%)
In month prior to foster care 52 5 3
During any month of foster care 58 38 22
In month prior to permanency 34 22 11
Months w/support ordered during foster care (%,cond'l on any)
During foster care 73 76 64
Mean support owed
In month prior to foster care $214 $11 $5
(305) (66) (37)
During foster care (over all months) $160 $69 $26
(274) (133) (69)
In month prior to permanency $135 $54 $20
(268) (140) (74)
Mean support owed if positive
In month prior to foster care $408 $221 $188
(313) (204) (120)
During foster care (in months with order) $330 $232 $176
(296) (169) (110)
In month prior to permanency $391 $246 $189
(329) (206) (135)
Note:N=2804. Sample:Mothers inWisconsinwith (1) no children in foster care in June 2004; (2) at least one child entering foster care between July 2004 and June 2006; (3) all children
transitioning to permanency (reuniﬁcation, adoption, guardianship, or other)within 48months; (4) all mother's children livewith her, and not with their father, at start of the foster care
spell; and (5) mother has at least one child with an identiﬁed father in IRP Multi-Sample Person File (MSPF) data (though it may not be a legally established paternity). The numbers in
parentheses are standard deviations in dollars.
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an order to pay support after the placement spell has started. Over the
full placement spell, the percentage of fathers owing support to the
mother rises slightly to 58%.18,19 Conversely, orders to offset foster
care costs rise dramatically for fathers, from 5% in the month prior to
placement to 38% during the full placement spell. The percentage of
mothers owing support for foster care also rises steeply, from 3% prior
to placement to 22% at any time during the full placement.
The second panel of Table 1 shows the stability of orders over the
placement spell. Among the 58% of mothers owed support by a father
at some point during placement, support was owed an average of 73%
of the months in the placement period. Thus, child support orders are
generally not fully redirected; mothers continue to have a current
order for fathers to pay support even during a placement spell when
at least some of their children are in foster care. However, the order
amounts are reduced as discussed below.17 Child support owed by the nonresident parent(s) will generally be automatically
redirected. A computerized interface between the administrative data systems of the child
welfare and child support systems alerts child supportworkers of the change in the child's
(children's) living situation, so that payments may be immediately redirected (Chellew et
al., 2012).
If all the father's children are placed out of home, all current child support paid may be
redirected; if only some of the father's children are placed, only the placed children's pro-
portionate share of the child support order should be redirected. In addition, fathers who
do not have an order to pay support at the time of placement may have an order initiated
after placement. A number of different factors may motivate the referral. Orders may be
pursued in order to recover the costs of substitute care, to improve the long-term econom-
ic stability of the mother's household to facilitate reuniﬁcation, because of a general com-
mitment to enforcing parental ﬁnancial support, or some combination of these reasons.
18 Note that the relatively high rate of orders from fathers to mothers during out-of-
home placement reﬂects in part orders during the ﬁrst months of the placement. For ex-
ample, for the 476mothers who experience a 7- to 12- month spell of their child(ren) be-
ing placed out of home, the percentage with an order at some time during the placement
falls from 51% (considering all months) to 46% if we exclude the ﬁrst month following
placement, and to 42% if we exclude the ﬁrst two months following placement. This indi-
cates that, for a fair number of cases, there are lags in referring the family to child support
and redirecting an existing order.
19 This in part reﬂects the instability of orders, which results in higher proportions with
orderswhenmeasured over a period longer than a singlemonth. To account for this effect,
we also examine orders only in themonth prior to permanency—theﬁnal fullmonth of the
spell (the third row of the ﬁrst panel in Table 1). In the month prior to permanency the
proportion with orders from fathers to mothers has fallen substantially from 58% to 34%.
Similar patterns are shown for the orders to mothers and fathers to offset substitute costs
(i.e., probabilities in the month prior to permanency are lower than the full placement
spell).
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port orders for all cases and for thosewith orders (that is, excluding those
with no order, and averaging only across months with an order). Consid-
ering the ﬁrst row in the ﬁnal panel we see the decline in the order
amount owed to mothers during placement (from $408 to $330).20 This
reﬂects at least two factors: (1) reductions in orders when at least some
of the children are in a foster care placement, and (2) relatively small
amounts owed in new orders established during placement.
These changes in orders and order amounts result in substantial im-
pacts on the resources available to mothers whose children have been
placed in foster care. Reﬂecting on the ﬁgures in Table 1, we can gauge
the potential change in total resources associated with changes in child
support orders. Averaging over all mothers—not just those with related
orders—we see that the mean support owed from fathers to mothers
fell from $214 before placement to an average of $160 during placement.
Themean support owed bymothers to offset the costs of foster care grew
from $5 to an average of $26 per month during placement and the stabil-
ity of this order is high (64%). The decline in support ordered from fathers
to mothers, and the burden of support ordered from mothers to reim-
burse the government, may constitute a substantial decline in potential
resources, given the high rates of poverty for these families.
While Table 1 reports on changes in potential resources as reﬂected
in child support orders, Table 2 shows changes in actual resources as
manifested by child support paid, again distinguishing the periods be-
fore and during placement. The ﬁrst row shows that in 25% of cases
there were payments from the father(s) to the mother in the month
prior to the start of the observed spell. This represents about half of
the 52% ofmotherswhowere owed support. Few parents owed support
to offset placement costs in the month before the placement, but about
half of those with an order paid something. During placement, about
57% of fathers with orders made payments. For orders to offset foster
care costs, payment rates are even higher: 77% of mothers with orders
made payments.21 Fathers follow the same pattern as mothers for off-
setting substitution care costs. Payments remain substantial, with20 All dollar amounts are in 2010 dollars using the December 2010 CPI-U.
21 Payments for those with orders not shown in table. The relatively high payment rates
may in part reﬂect distribution rules. During episodes of out-of-home placement, pay-
ments are applied to offset the costs of placement before they are applied to child support
owed to the family.
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Table 2
Child support payments before and during foster care placements.
Paid by fathers to mother Paid by fathers to govt.
for foster care costs
Paid by mothers to govt. for
foster care costs
Any support paid
In month prior to foster care 25 2 1
During any month of foster care 33 28 17
In month prior to permanency 17 13 7
Months w/support ordered during foster care (%,cond'l on any)
During foster care 63 53 40
Mean support paid
In month prior to foster care $106 $5 $2
During foster care (over all months) $79 $36 $14
In month prior to permanency $65 $31 $14
Mean support paid if positive
In month prior to foster care $422 $203 $169
During foster care (in months with order) $331 $226 $226
In month prior to permanency $380 $248 $221
Note:N=2804. Sample:Mothers inWisconsinwith (1) no children in foster care in June 2004; (2) at least one child entering foster care between July 2004 and June 2006; (3) all children
transitioning to permanency (reuniﬁcation, adoption, guardianship, or other) within 48months; (4) all mother's children livewith her, and not with their father, at start of the foster care
spell; and (5) mother has at least one child with an identiﬁed father in IRP Multi-Sample Person File (MSPF) data (though it may not be a legally established paternity).
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and $226 each from fathers andmothers to offset the costs of foster care.
Again, we can see the impact the child support systemhas in determin-
ing the resources available to families with children in foster care. Overall,
these results suggest that about half the mothers are owed current child
support from their child(ren)'s father(s), and about half of those with or-
ders receive a payment. The proportion with an order rises somewhat,
and theproportionwith apayment risesmore substantially,whenwecom-
pare the month prior to placement to the full spell. But these changes in
child support owed and paid by the father(s) to themother aremodest rel-
ative to thedramatic increase in child support owedandpaid by eachof the
parents tooffset the costs of foster care. Payments tooffset the costsof foster
care are fairly modest when averaged over all mothers. But for families
making payments, the amounts are substantial, especially given the low in-
comes of most families with children placed out of home.
6.2. Factors associated with child support orders and payments
Wehave documented the considerable level of participation in child
support by families involved with CPS, and the substantial variation in
the likelihood of child support orders and payments before and during
foster care placement. In this section we consider factors associated
with child support orders and payments for these families, focusing on
variation by child support history and economic and demographic char-
acteristics of the family. Because there is a substantial literature consid-
ering the characteristics associated with child support orders and
payments from nonresident to resident parents (Sorensen & Hill,
2004; Ha, Cancian, Meyer, & Han, 2008), we focus our attention on pat-
terns of orders and payments to offset placement costs. As discussed
above, when children enter foster care, child support orders may be
newly established or modiﬁed. However, we expect to ﬁnd substantial
consistency over time in the proportion of mothers with orders, as
shown in the second panel of Table 3.22 We also observe a difference22 About half of all mothers were owed support by a father prior to placement, and of
these, virtually all (99%) continue to be owed support and half (51%) have support owed
by fathers to offset the costs of placement at some time during placement. In contrast,
among mothers who were not owed support prior to placement, only 13% are ordered
support during placement, and in only 23% of cases are orders established for the father
to offset the costs of placement. In addition to beingmore likely to continue to have an or-
der,motherswith a history of a child support order are likely to have somewhat higher av-
erage order amounts—$342 rather than $226 owed by the father to the mother, and $239
rather than $214 owed by the father to offset substitute care costs. Mothers with a pre-
placement order are also substantiallymore likely to receive a child support payment from
fathers, though compliance (payment conditional on an order) is actually higher for those
with new orders (i.e., 52% for those with a history of a child support orders and 61% for
thosewith neworders). Payments from father(s) to offset the costs of care were alsomore
common in cases with pre-placement orders (38%) than without (17%).
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by their pre-placement child support order status.23
The remaining panels of Table 3 show variation in orders and
payments by parents' economic and demographic characteristics.
We show results for fathers' earnings,24 and mothers' earnings,25
race, and ethnicity, and whether the mother has had children
with more than one father. For both mothers and fathers earnings
information comes from Unemployment Insurance wage records
for the year prior to placement.
For orders and payments from fathers to mothers during placement,
we see that both are generally more likely when the father has higher
earnings, though the relationship is not monotonic, and the probability
of an order and a payment to the mother falls slightly for the highest cat-
egory. As expected given child support guidelines (in which orders are to
be based on the noncustodial parent's income), order and payment
amounts to themother also tend to risewith father's earnings. In contrast,
there is little consistent relationship between father's earnings and the
probability of an order to pay support to offset costs of foster care, and a
remarkably weak relationship between father's earnings and the amount
of the order to offset costs. That is, we ﬁnd little evidence of a relationship
betweenorders to offset placement costs and father's ability to pay. Actual
payments to offset costs are somewhat more likely in cases in which the
father has higher earnings, though the relationship is not consistent. Sim-
ilarly, there is no consistent relationship between mother's earnings and
the likelihood that either parent owed or paid support to offset costs. Con-
sidering white, black, and Hispanic mothers (the three largest racial and
ethnic groups), we see that Hispanics are least likely to be owed support
from a father during placement (49%, relative to 60% and 59% for white
and black mothers, respectively), and black and Hispanic mothers were
less likely thanwhitemothers to have support paid (26% and 28%, respec-
tively, compared to 37%). Black mothers are least likely to have owed or23 Nineteen percent of those with a pre-placement order, relative to 15% of those with-
out, made a payment to offset costs. Again, as we sawwith order amounts, we ﬁnd some-
what higher payments from fathers to mothers for those with pre-placement orders, but
no consistent difference in the amount of child support paid by either parent to offset
costs.
24 When there is more than one father, we consider the earnings of the highest-earning
father, and compare this to amounts owed and paid across all fathers. It is important to
note that there are no reported earnings for the father(s) in the year prior to placement
in 52% of the cases. On the other hand, among those with earnings, a substantial portion
earned over $25,000 (17% of all fathers, and 36% of those with earnings).
25 As with fathers, most mothers had no recorded earnings (59%), or very low earnings,
in the year prior to placement. Only 13% of mothers had earnings over $10,000.
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Table 3
Child support orders and payments during foster care placements by CS history and parents' characteristics.
Any support owed (%) Mean support owed if positive Any support paid (%) Mean support paid if positive
N % of
sample
By
fathers
to
mother
By
fathers to
govt. for
foster
care costs
By
mothers
to govt.
for foster
care costs
By
fathers
to
mother
By
fathers to
govt. for
foster
care costs
By
mothers
to govt.
for foster
care costs
Paid by
fathers
to
mother
Paid by
fathers to
govt. for
foster care
costs
Paid by
mothers to
govt. for
foster care
costs
Paid by
fathers
to
mother
Paid by
fathers to
govt. for
foster care
costs
Paid by
mothers to
govt. for
foster care
costs
All mothers 2804 100% 58 38 22 $330 $232 $176 33 28 17 $331 $226 $226
By child support
order history
Mother owed
before foster
carea
1471 52% 99 51 24 $342 $239 $175 52 38 19 $377 $226 $202
Mother not
owed before
foster care
1333 48% 13 23 20 $226 $214 $178 13 17 15 $391 $308 $249
By earnings of
highest-earning
father in year
before foster
care
No earnings 1445 52% 51 35 23 $305 $230 $177 27 24 17 $317 $230 $226
$1 to $2500 260 9% 57 43 22 $250 $194 $166 29 28 17 $272 $163 $208
$2501 to $5000 122 4% 70 40 21 $234 $192 $158 31 28 18 $269 $173 $202
$5001 to
$10,000
153 5% 63 44 22 $270 $209 $165 46 37 14 $270 $187 $212
$10,001 to
$25,000
348 12% 69 43 20 $333 $220 $178 47 34 16 $305 $207 $299
$25,001 to high 476 17% 66 36 20 $468 $290 $185 40 31 17 $441 $288 $199
By earnings of
mother in year
before foster
care
No earnings 1647 59% 54 37 20 $309 $237 $170 30 26 15 $316 $228 $214
$1 to $2500 477 17% 60 39 26 $303 $225 $170 35 30 19 $302 $204 $170
$2501 to $5000 152 5% 65 36 22 $287 $214 $162 39 27 22 $333 $183 $251
$5001 to
$10,000
154 5% 68 41 24 $352 $210 $168 40 32 19 $419 $234 $196
$10,001 to
$25,000
260 9% 68 42 20 $415 $245 $197 39 32 19 $368 $257 $340
$25,001 to high 114 4% 68 35 21 $494 $207 $281 34 27 18 $417 $246 $345
By mother's
race/ethnicity
None or
missing
13 0% 8 8 . $457 $339 . 8 8 . $182 $240 .
White 1683 60% 60 39 25 $361 $241 $179 37 32 21 $345 $246 $211
Black 658 23% 59 39 14 $240 $181 $162 26 21 9 $237 $136 $382
Hispanic 268 10% 49 31 21 $358 $255 $183 28 20 16 $417 $218 $196
Asian 8 0% 38 13 13 $361 $355 $151 13 13 13 $456 $328 $134
Multiple 174 6% 52 36 24 $319 $316 $173 33 26 15 $341 $268 $137
By number of
men with
whom mother
has children
One father 963 34% 42 28 20 $306 $241 $191 24 23 16 $337 $234 $210
2 fathers 1089 39% 63 40 23 $326 $222 $164 34 29 18 $319 $231 $208
3+ fathers 752 27% 72 46 21 $352 $236 $179 44 32 16 $340 $211 $276
Note:N=2853. Sample:Mothers inWisconsinwith (1) no children in foster care in June 2004; (2) at least one child entering foster care between July 2004 and June 2008; (3) all children
transitioning to permanency (reuniﬁcation, adoption, guardianship, or other) within 48months; (4) all mother's children livewith her, and not with their father, at start of the foster care
spell; and (5) mother has at least one child with an identiﬁed father in IRP Multi-Sample Person File (MSPF) data (though it may not be a legally established paternity).
8 M. Cancian et al. / Children and Youth Services Review xxx (2016) xxx–xxxpaid support to offset costs,26 the fathers of white mothers' children are
somewhat more likely to have owed and substantially more likely to
have paid support to offset foster care placement costs. Mothers who
have had children with multiple fathers are more likely to have been
owed and paid support from at least one father, and to have at least one26 The relatively low level of orders to offset substitute care costs among black mothers
in part reﬂects regional policy differences. As discussed further below, there is substantial
variation across counties in the proportion of caseswith orders.Milwaukee County, which
includes a large share ofWisconsin cases involving blackmothers, has relatively low levels
of orders to offset placement costs.
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there is no consistent relationship between the number of fathers and
mothers' orders or payments to offset costs.
6.3. The relationship between child support orders and payments and
placement duration
We now turn to the key question motivating this analysis: Is there a
relationship between the child support orders and payments during
placement and the length of the observed placement spell? Speciﬁcally,
we examine whether the establishment of an order for a mother to paytended consequences of charging parents for foster care, Children and
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Table 4
The relationship between child support orders and placement duration. GMM estimates predicting log time to reuniﬁcation.
Independent variable Coefﬁcient Marginal effects
Evaluated at mean value (21.0 months) Evaluated at median value (11.0 months)
Child support ordered $ (from mother for foster care) 0.00604⁎⁎⁎ (0.00113) 12.7 ($100 increase) 6.6 ($100 increase)
Mother is black (relative to White) 0.343⁎⁎⁎ (0.0615) 8.6 4.5
Mother is Hispanic 0.0739 (0.0814) 1.6 0.8
Mother is other race/ethn 0.0332 (0.0928) 0.7 0.4
Mother's age −0.00726 (0.00555) −0.2 (1 year older) −0.1 (1 year older)
Oldest father's age 0.0140⁎⁎⁎ (0.00369) 0.3 (1 year older) 0.2 (1 year older)
Oldest child's age −0.0449⁎⁎⁎ (0.00698) −1.1 (1 year older) −0.6 (1 year older)
Number of siblings 0.0265⁎ (0.0138) 0.6 (1 more sibling) 0.3 (1 more sibling)
2 fathers (relative to one) −0.00889 (0.0565) −0.2 −0.1
3+ fathers 0.118 (0.0734) 2.6 1.4
Earnings of highest-earning father b5 K (but N0) 0.175⁎⁎ (0.0744) 4.0 2.1
Earnings of highest-earning father 5–10 K −0.0419 (0.106) −0.9 −0.5
Earnings of highest-earning father 10–25 K 0.125 (0.0769) 2.8 1.5
Earnings of highest-earning father N25 K 0.115 (0.0712) 2.6 1.3
Earnings of mother b3 K (but N0) −0.140⁎⁎ (0.0676) −2.7 −1.4
Earnings of mother 3–10 K −0.331⁎⁎⁎ (0.0782) −5.9 −3.1
Earnings of mother N10 K −0.220⁎⁎⁎ (0.0751) −4.1 −2.2
Substantiation rate in the county 0.00317 (0.00422) 0.1 (1% increase in substantiation rate) 0.0 (1% increase in substantiation rate)
Constant 2.107⁎⁎⁎ (0.144)
Observations 2921
R-squared 0.129
df_m 18
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.
The original sample of 3032mothers is reduced to 2921 because we excludemothers living in counties with fewer than 10 cases (for whichwe do not estimate a probability of referral to
child support). The sample includes cases with time to permanency longer than 48 months. The ﬁrst column shows the estimated coefﬁcients of the second stage of IV estimation. The
second column shows themarginal effect evaluated at themean placement months, the third is evaluated at themedian placementmonths. All earnings are as reported to theWisconsin
Unemployment Insurance system.
⁎⁎⁎ p b 0.01.
⁎⁎ p b 0.05.
⁎ p b 0.1.
28 In our base model we estimate mother's order to offset the costs of substitute care,
using county order probabilities as an instrument. Aswe discuss below, orders formothers
to offset costs are potentially important—beyond the observed costs due to support actu-
ally collected—because they serve as a tax on earnings (aswell as leading to tax intercepts,
and potential additional enforcement actions). However, if our primary concern is the di-
rect loss of income due to orders to offset costs, it may be more appropriate to consider
both mothers' orders to pay, and mothers' loss of income due to fathers' child support be-
ing redirected from mothers to the government to offset costs of care. As an alternative
speciﬁcation, we estimate a county-level instrumental variable based on the average child
support that mother and father(s) owed to offset foster care cost during the out-of-home
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time to reuniﬁcation. Table 4 shows the results of our IVmodel, which uti-
lizes county-level variation in child support referrals.27 The results show
that child support order amounts are positively associated with length of
time to reuniﬁcation (p b 0.01). These estimates support a causal interpre-
tation of the positive relationship between orders to offset costs and time to
reuniﬁcation; they suggest that ordering mothers to pay support to offset
the costs of foster care delays reuniﬁcation. The point estimates indicate a
very large marginal effect; a $100 increase in the monthly child support
order amount is predicted to increase the months to reuniﬁcation by
6.6 months (evaluated at the median time-to-reuniﬁcation value, which is
11 months). Estimates of time to permanency (including reuniﬁcation,
adoption, and guardianship) yield very similar results. Given the lack of
other research in this areawe cannotmake direct comparisons to other es-
timates.However,Wells andGuo(2006)alsoﬁnda largeeffect of the loss of
welfare incomeon reuniﬁcation,with childrenofmotherswho lost a signif-
icant amount of income from cash assistance more than twice as likely to
remain out of home a year after placement (87% vs. 41%).
The remaining results are largely consistent with expectations,
though, again, the lack of research on this topic means we cannot com-
pare our results with prior analyses. Relative to white mothers, black
mothers have longer spells with an estimated difference of 4.5 months
evaluated at median time-to- reuniﬁcation value (p b 0.01). This may
be the result of differences in outcomes directly associated with race,
or due to other correlated circumstances (e.g., neighborhood resources
or reasons for initial placement) not captured by our relatively sparse
set of control variables. There is no discernible difference in the times
to reuniﬁcation for white and Hispanic mothers. There is no signiﬁ-
cant relationship between mother's age and time to reuniﬁcation,
though older fathers are associated with longer spells. Older children
are associated with shorter spells, while having a greater number of27 The ﬁrst stage robust F-test statistic is 144.486 without clustering and 138.565 with
clustering at county level, indicating the instrument (county-level variation in the propor-
tion of mothers ordered to pay support to offset the costs of care) is not weak.
Please cite this article as: Cancian, M., et al., Making parents pay: The unin
Youth Services Review (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.childyouth.2016children is associated with longer spells. As expected, mothers with
higher earnings prior to the initial placement have shorter spells, with
earnings of up to $3000 in the prior year associated with an estimated
1.4 months decrease in months to reuniﬁcation (evaluated at median
time-to-reuniﬁcation value, p b 0.1), and earnings of $3000 to $10,000
or over $10,000 associatedwith 3.1 and 2.2months decrease, respectively
(evaluated at median time-to-reuniﬁcation value, p b 0.01). In contrast,
fathers' earnings do not exhibit any consistent pattern.
7. Sensitivity tests
In our base model we estimate the relationship between a mother's
predicted order to pay to offset the costs of foster care and the time to
reuniﬁcation, using GMM to estimate an instrumental variable model
with county rates of such orders as our instrument. We also estimate a
set of alternative speciﬁcations as sensitivity tests and ﬁnd that our
main conclusion—that orders to offset costs are associated with longer
spells of foster care—is robust across these speciﬁcations. The sensitivity
tests consider both different subsamples and alternative estimation
strategies—comparing GMM with two-stage least squares (2SLS) and
limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimates.28placement periods, assuming that father(s)' order amounts represent the resources that
father(s) would otherwise be ordered to pay to mothers. The results are consistent with
our base estimates; a $100 increase in themonthly child support order amount is predict-
ed to increase themonths to reuniﬁcation or other permanency by 5.6 months (evaluated
at the median time-to-permanency value, which is 11 months).
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between child support orders and length of time until reuniﬁcation also
holdwhenwe limit our sample to caseswith only younger children, and
when we exclude Milwaukee County (the state's single largest urban
county) cases from our sample. Finally, our base sample includes only
cases for which we can determine that the mother had all her children
living with her at the time of the initial foster care placement. We ﬁnd
qualitatively similar results, indicating a positive and signiﬁcant rela-
tionship between redirected child support and time in foster care place-
ment, for a more inclusive sample not limited by living arrangements.
When we estimate our base model using 2SLS and LIML, our main
results are consistent across speciﬁcations and the point estimates are
remarkably stable. For example, a $100 increase in mother's order is es-
timated to increase the spell length by 6.6months (evaluated at theme-
dian time-to-permanency value, which is 11 months) regardless of the
estimation methods; only standard errors vary.29 A $100 increase in
the sum of mother's order and the redirection of father's support is esti-
mated to increase the spell length by 5.1months (2SLS) and 6.7months
(LIML), respectively, evaluated at the median time-to- reuniﬁcation
value of 11 months.8. Conclusions: limitations and implications for policy
Parents whose children have been removed from their custody may
be ordered to pay child support to offset the costs of foster care. These
payments are intended to be a source of revenue for states and counties
with very limited resources tomeet human services needs, and they are
consistent with the principle that parents should provide for their chil-
dren ﬁnancially, even when they are not able to provide custodial care.
However, there are concerns that requiring child support from pre-
placement resident parents, or redirecting existing child support orders,
may lengthen the time their children spend in foster care by reducing
the economic resources available to help them achieve the conditions
of reuniﬁcation.
Notwithstanding the potential importance of these payments and
concerns about potential unintended consequences, there has been re-
markably little empirical analysis of the relationship between child sup-
port and CPS and the potential effects on family well-being and
government costs. This paper begins to ﬁll that gap, providing one of
the ﬁrst systematic analyses of a statewide sample of families served
by the two systems. We ﬁnd that a majority of families with CPS in-
volvement have child support orders before placement, and a substan-
tial minority of nonresident fathers and pre-placement resident
mothers are ordered to pay support to offset costs associatedwith foster
care placement. Considering cases in our primary sample of mother-
only families, in 38% of cases a nonresident father was ordered to pay
such support, and 28% made a payment averaging $226 per month in
months with a payment. Mothers were ordered to pay support to offset
foster care costs in 22% of cases, andmade a payment in 17% of cases, av-
eraging $226 per month in months with a payment. We found remark-
ably little association between parents' earnings and the probability of
an order or the amount ordered to offset public costs, suggesting that
the system may not be particularly sensitive to parents' ability to pay.
This stands in marked contrast to normal child support practice,
which usually bases child support orders on the payer's income.
Our central question of interest is whether establishing a child sup-
port order affects time in foster care. We ﬁnd evidence of a positive
relationship—cases in which orders are imposed are more likely to
have longer spells. Our multivariate analysis exploiting county policy
variation provides support for a causal interpretation, with a $100 in-
crease in child support orders leading to a 6.6 month delay in reuniﬁca-
tion (measured at the mean). These results are robust to alternative29 Coefﬁcients are all 0.00604 for GMM, 2SLS, and LIML. Standard errors are 0.00113,
0.00118, and 0.00118, respectively, for GMM, 2SLS, and LIML.
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mothers' orders and the redirection of fathers' support.
These results provide important new evidence of the potential unin-
tended consequences of designing child support to recover government
costs—in this case for foster care. Though we provide what we believe
are the ﬁrst estimates of the effect of child support orders on the length
of foster care placement, our approach is limited and there aremany re-
lated questions requiring further research. Our study exploits a natural
experiment that arises from county policy variation in a single state. It
requires administrative data—which has advantages for this study, but
also limitations—and cannot necessarily be generalized to other states.
Both national and Wisconsin rates of foster care placement have been
declining. Wisconsin's recent placement rate has been modestly below
national averages, in part due to relatively large declines (U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for
Children and Families, 2014; Child Trends, 2011); results might be ex-
pected to differ for states with higher placement rates. In addition, we
do not address potential heterogeneity by type of case (e.g., abuse or ne-
glect), or by family characteristics (e.g., other characteristics such as
race, child's or parents' age); a better understanding of these differences
would inform more targeted policy reforms.
The ﬁndings reported here have implications for child support and
child welfare policy. They also illustrate the importance of considering
the unintended consequences of policies, especially those related to
multiple systems with different underlying objectives and procedures.
Removing children from the custody of their parents is one of the
most forceful actions that government can take to intervene in a family,
andmaintaining children in foster care is potentially very costly. Recent
research provides mixed evidence regarding the impacts on child well-
being and subsequent outcomes of foster care placement, and duration
of time out of home (Doyle, 2007; Berger, Bruch, Johnson, James, &
Rubin, 2009; Fallesen, 2013; Font & Maguire-Jack, 2013). The ﬁnancial
costs of care largely motivate efforts to have parents offset the costs
by paying child support. However, our results suggest these efforts
may prove to be misguided; related estimates suggest that consequent
delays in permanency mean that charging parents child support that
goes to offset government costs may ultimately increase total public
costs (Chellew et al., 2012). Policies requiring that parents pay to offset
the costs of foster care should be considered in the light of their conse-
quences for reuniﬁcation. States may want to contemplate policies that
delay the imposition of child support orders until later in the CPS pro-
cess, create clear standards for any such referral decisions, and allow
for the re-assessment of such referrals. While the objectives, ﬁnancing,
and targeting of child support enforcement and CPS efforts are quite dif-
ferent, many families are dually served. Cross-system interactions must
be more carefully considered in order to avoid unintended negative
consequences for the vulnerable children whose lives are shaped by
both systems.
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